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MARBURY'S MIXED MESSAGES*
GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS"
It is generally bad manners to deprecate the celebrant at a birthday party.
I am afraid, though, that by that standard my comments in this two-hundredth
anniversary symposium honoring Marbury v. Madison' will seem illmannered indeed. That is because I intend to suggest that Marbury is a less
important decision than scholars and lawyers generally maintain, and that it
is perhaps less important today than it has ever been.
To be fair, Marbury plays to all our prejudices about what ought to be
important. It is a Supreme Court decision, and lawyers-and especially law
professors-love Supreme Court decisions. Marburyis an oldSupreme Court
decision, and age retains a certain dignity even today. It is a Supreme Court
decision that aggrandizes Supreme Court powers, something that naturally
flatters the interests of lawyers. Furthermore, Marbury is a very clever
Supreme Court decision, and lawyers (and law professors) tend, like James
Branch Cabell's eponymous protagonist Jurgen, to prize cleverness above all
else.2
Jurgen, however, eventually learned that his faith in cleverness was
misplaced, and I think that lawyers and law professors might benefit from the
same lesson. At any rate, I will do my best to make the case that they, or
perhaps I should say "we," do so suffer.

* Address at the Marbury v. Madison: 200 Years of Judicial Review in America
Symposium at the University of Tennessee College of Law (Feb. 21, 2003) (transcript on file
with the Tennessee Law Review).
** Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D.
Yale Law School, 1985; B.A. University of Tennessee, 1982.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See JAMESBRANCHCABELL, JURGEN: ACOMEDYOFJUSTICE292 (Dover Publ'ns, Inc.
1977) (1921). In the text, Jurgen has just met Koshchei the Deathless, "who made things as
they are." Id. at 290. The full passage reads:
Jurgen perceived that this Koshchei the Deathless was not particularly intelligent. Then
Jurgen wondered why he should ever have expected Koshchei to be intelligent. Koshchei
was omnipotent, as men estimate omnipotence: but by what course of reasoning had
people come to believe that Koshchei was clever, as men estimate cleverness? The fact
that, to the contrary, Koshchei seemed well-meaning, but rather slow of apprehension and
a little needlessly fussy, went far toward explaining a host of matters which had long
puzzled Jurgen. Cleverness was, of course, the most admirable of all traits: but cleverness
was not at the top of things, and never had been.
Id. at 292. Jurgen, who has always prided himself on his cleverness, learns much from this
encounter. Jurgen's observations about Koshchei may apply to the Supreme Court (which as
Justice Robert H. Jackson noted is not final because it is infallible, but is infallible because it
is final) as well. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
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MARBURY IN THE CLASSROOM

One of the reasons why Marbury seems especially important is that it is
the very first case taught in most constitutional law courses. It is even the first
case in many constitutional law casebooks.
Traditionally, the case is taught in a somewhat schizophrenic way. On the
one hand, we (that is, we law professors) tend to criticize Marbury as, well,
tricky. In doing so, we generally crib rather heavily from William Van
Alstyne's classic, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison 3-the honest ones
among us admit it, the less-honest pretend they worked it all out themselves.
Marshall's various tricks are outlined in some detail, and the opinion is, by the
end, presented as a bit of rather clever sleight-of-hand. The suggestion,
usually buttressed with the obligatory references to Alexander Bickel and
James Bradley Thayer, is that with such a shaky foundation there is something
slightly fishy about the whole enterprise ofjudicial review.
Yet, after this suggestion has been made, the emphasis shifts to just how
clever Marshall was and to how important judicial review is today. Indeed,
it is interesting that although we in the academy often criticize Marbury, few
are willing to take that criticism seriously enough to suggest that Roe, or
Miranda,or Brown4 should not be regarded as binding precedent. Indeed, one
of the constitutional law casebooks that breaks with the tradition of putting
Marbury at the front simply replaces Marbury with Brown, thus assuming the
legitimacy of the judicial review practice that Marbury established.
This endorsement of Marbury's precedent, coupled with the critique of
its foundations, sends another signal to our students, to the bench and bar, and
perhaps even to ourselves: Marshall may have been tricky, and perhaps a
shade dishonest, but he got away with it, and that is a good thing. By
implication, then, tricky judging-at least in a good cause-is a good thing so
long as you get away with it.
This schizophrenic approach has produced an entire field of literature,
relating to the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which I have discussed
elsewhere at tiresome length.' In brief, I regard the countermajoritarian
difficulty as far less important than the extensive scholarly attention it has
received might suggest, not least because the scholarly commentary treats the
Supreme Court as far more important, and, paradoxically, far more fragile,
than it really is.

3. William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies andJurisprudence:Robert Bork Griswold andthe
Philosophy of OriginalUnderstanding,24 GA. L. REv. 1045 (1990).
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II. ON THE UNIMPORTANCE OF MARBURY AND THE SUPREME COURT

As I mention above, Marburytends, by its very nature, to exaggerate the
importance of the Supreme Court. It was an original jurisdiction case,
meaning that the spotlight shone on the Supreme Court undimmed by passage
through the usual cloud of lower-court fact-finding and reasoning. Marbury
represented a head-on confrontation between a politically powerful President
and a rather weak Supreme Court. Additionally it took place at a time when
there were few lower courts, making what the Supreme Court did far more
important.
Now, of course, things are rather different. Some of these differences
make Marbury less important, while others tend to diminish the importance
of the Court itself. Original jurisdiction cases are rather rare nowadays and
are always inconsequential (in itself, I suppose, a sort of legacy of Marbury).
Political confrontations between the Court and Presidents are rare, and the
Court is in a far, far stronger position than it enjoyed in Marshall and
Jefferson's time. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan6
rebounded on him (though it may---or may not-have changed the Court's
behavior), and the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore,7 though unpopular
among law professors, seems to have done no real harm to the Court's
position, nor to have inspired even the faintest possibility of disobedience
from losing Presidential candidate Albert Gore, Jr. Even fans of the Supreme
Court's Bush opinion will, I think, agree that the Court felt no pressure to
display Marshallian cleverness. Similarly, it was decades after Marbury
before the Supreme Court struck down another act of Congress, while such
action by the Court is routine today.
It is thus no surprise that the Supreme Court finds itself the focus of most
constitutional law scholarship today, although a cynic might conclude that this
is also because it is easy to study a single institution. The Court is the focus
of numerous journals and nearly every law school offers at least one course
of the "Supreme Court Seminar" variety. Major news services have Supreme
Court correspondents. And Supreme Court confirmation battles have become
so bruising that even the prospect of one inspires nervousness in both parties.
Although the Court is stronger in relation to the other branches than it was
when Marburywas decided, it is probably less important in the grand scheme
of things, which makes Marbury less important as well. Lower courts were
few in the Marbury era, but now they are plentiful.
The Supreme Court's caseload continues to fall, with the Court producing
76 signed opinions last year, down from 129 thirty years before. And this
drop has occurred despite a dramatic growth in the number of opinions issued
by lower federal courts and state supreme courts. In the twelve months ending

6. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERO, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION INTHE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).

7.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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September 30, 2002, the regional Courts of Appeals decided 27,758 cases on
the merits, compared to a mere 777 for the year ending March 31, 1973.8 The
result is that, as a percentage of the whole, virtually no lower-court opinions
are reviewed by the Supreme Court. A given opinion in a trial court, in fact,
is probably less likely to see Supreme Court review than the trialj udge issuing
it is to be struck by lightning.
Traditionally, this is not supposed to matter. In the classical view, lowercourt judges faithfully apply Supreme Court decisions to cases in front of
them, meaning that the Court need issue only general guidance. It is not clear
at all that this is true, or ever has been: one is reminded of Truman's famous
comment about Eisenhower and the bureaucracy. 9 But whether it was true in
the past, it seems rather obvious that lower courts today are acting like
bureaucrats who tend to follow their own institutional agendas, not likejunior
Platonic guardians who faithfully attend to instructions from on high.
That, at least, is what Brannon Denning and I have found in a multiyear
survey' o of lower-court opinions responding to the Supreme Court's holdings
in the UnitedStates v. Lopez" and UnitedStates v. Morrison" opinions. Our
research, in fact, suggests that lower courts are acting like the imaginary judge
described by Judge Gilbert S. Merritt in a prophetic Yale Law Journalarticle
written over two decades ago.
I am a manager of events, appointed to get a job done, and that what is
important is not so much the process and the creative act but the result, the
practical consequences, the effect on society. Like senators, university
administrators, newspaper publishers, and major executives, I must
concentrate on the big picture and delegate responsibility to others to carry
out my orders. Nobody reads district court opinions these days except the
parties. Gone are the days of the poets and philosophers of the law like
Marshall, Shaw, Holmes, Hand, Cardozo, and Traynor. 3

8. These figures were compiled by Sibyl Marshall of the University of Tennessee
College of Law's Joel A. Katz Law Library.
9. One political historian has described the context and the quote as follows:
In the early summer of 1952, before the heat of the campaign, President Truman used
to contemplate the problems of the General-become-President should Eisenhower win the
forthcoming election. "He'll sit here," Truman would remark (tapping his desk for
emphasis), "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it
won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating."
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO
CARTER 9 (1980).
10. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce ClauseJurisprudenceEncountersthe Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253 (2003).

11.
12.

514U.S. 549(1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).

13. Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on ParadiseLost: The JudicialBureaucracy in the
Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1469, 1471 (1983).
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In short, all too often a "desk-clearing mentality' 14 is in the driver's seat.
Following is a short description of what we found, followed by some further
thoughts on what this means for the importance (or lack thereof) of the
Supreme Court.
In short, we thought that the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez offered
an interesting opportunity to watch a major doctrinal shift percolate through
the lower courts. Prior to Lopez, the conventional wisdom was that Congress
could do essentially anything it wanted under the Commerce Clause,
something that, as Deborah Merritt noted, had became a law-school joke by
the 1980s.' Indeed, as Lynn Baker and Ernest Young have pointed out,
federalism had by that time become part of a "Constitution in exile."' 6
Observing the lower courts' response to this change seemed likely to provide
some insight into how lower courts respond to Supreme Court doctrine
generally.
And it did, though at first things were a bit unclear. The initial installment
of our project, published in the WisconsinLaw Review in 2000, was subtitled
"What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody
Came?"' 7 There, we concluded that lower courts seemed strangely slow to
respond to the Lopez decision, but suggested that Supreme Court clarification
might improve matters.
Lopez decisions provide a background for two very different, though not
necessarily entirely inconsistent, stories. One story-not very flattering to
court of appeals judges-is that of an ossified intermediate bench in the
throes of "judicial sclerosis," unable or unwilling to apply Supreme Court
decisions that depart too sharply from business as usual. This story seems
particularly compelling in the context of the drug and firearms cases, where
the courts' impatience with constitutional arguments that might keep
unpopular offenders out of jail is palpable, and where Lopez issues are
dismissed in terse paragraphs containing little or no analysis.
But there is another story, too; this one is not very flattering to the
Supreme Court. The view of appellate judging provided in most law school
classes is a fairly simple one: Higher courts select principles, which lower
courts then apply faithfully. As any lawyer with even a modicum of practice
experience can attest, the situation in the real world is more complex. For
example, that the lower courts are supposed to apply principles articulated by
higher courts presumes that the principles of the upper courts are easily
identifiable and readily available for application by the lower courts. But as
the multiplicity of readings to which Lopez has been subject suggests, higher
14.

The phrase is William Van Alstyne's. Denning &Reynolds, supra note 10, at 1309.

15. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 691 (1995).
16. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalismand the Double Standard ofJudicial
Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 75 (2001).
17. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower CourtReadings of Lopez, or What
ifthe Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WiS. L. REV.
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courts (in this case, the United States Supreme Court) do not always fulfill
this responsibility.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck a bold and telling blow for limited
government and a return to the first principles of the Constitution. Or it
didn't. Or maybe it did, but it just did not say it very well. After all, it does
not matter how loudly you speak if you mumble when you do so.
How will we know which? The cynical-and, perhaps sadly,
correct-answer in this case is, we will know when the Supreme Court tells
us. Given the Court's decision this Term to resolve the split in the circuits
over the Violence Against Women Act occasioned by the Brzonkala decision,
as well as the scope of the federal arson statute, perhaps Supreme Court
resolution is not too far away. 8
Though the Supreme Court was almost certainly unmoved by our pleas,
it did grant certiorari in those very cases, and in both it seemed to underscore
the importance of the Lopez decision in terms that seemed to remove most
excuses for lower-court foot-dragging. A couple of years later, we authored
the next installment of our survey. 9 Unfortunately, we found that lower
courts were, in fact, doing little to put Lopez's reasoning into effect.
Examining the large number of lower-court cases addressing Commerce
Clause issues, we found ample evidence of a desk-clearing mentality at work.
We concluded:
But if ideology is not the source of lower court resistance-or, if any
sustained inquiry is likely to result in the old Scots verdict, "not proven"-is
there an explanation for lower courts' behavior? Research by other scholars
suggests that the problem here, to paraphrase former presidential candidate
Michael Dukakis, is not ideology, but rather competence. What we are
seeing in lower courts' Commerce Clause decisions may be only symptomatic
of a larger problem in the federal judiciary: that of courts responding to an
increasingly unmanageable caseload by resorting to comer-cutting, resulting
in an overall reduction in the quality of courts' work product.
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land. Lower courts follow
its precedents. The makeup of the Supreme Court is thus the most important
influence on American constitutional law. These are statements so taken for
granted that they are seldom even examined. But in fact, reality seems to be
more complex than that.
That complexity holds a number of lessons. One is that the way we teach
constitutional law is simplistic: the way that Supreme Court opinions affect
the system is far more complex and indeterminate than the casebooks suggest.
That complexity exists in a variety of forms, but the way in which Supreme
Court precedents do (or do not) percolate down through the lower courts is
surely more important than the standard tale would make it seem. Another is
18. Id. at 397, 399-400 (footnotes omitted).
19. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 10.
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that the lower courts simply are not living up to the general expectations we
have had for them, in terms of thoughtfulness, fairness, and a willingness to
give a hearing to litigants regardless of their stature or of the crimes of which
they are accused. This failure is a serious one, not only for justice but for the
very legitimacy of the system. °
In light of the above, it seems fair to say that Marbury, and the whole train
of chin-pulling articles on the legitimacy ofjudicial review that it inspired, is
far less important than is generally supposed. If no one listens to the Supreme
Court (and that is no great exaggeration of what we found in the Lopez
context), then the judicial review established in Marbury simply is not very
important. The Supreme Court may strike down a statute here and there, but
if the lower courts do not go along, as they in some settings are not, its power
is quite limited, especially when it takes only a few dozen cases a year.
III. PAYING MoRE ATTENTION

In one sense, Marbury and the mindset that its scholarly reception has
created seems to have distracted us from the real source of judicial power.
While everyone focuses on the Supreme Court, the real and effectively
unreviewable power is exercised by the Courts of Appeals. That power is less
controversial because it is exercised less often in ways that make waves: like
good bureaucrats, the Courts of Appeals tend to avoid controversy, and to
make their output sufficiently boring that few will bother to read it in search
of the controversial bits anyway.
One response to this-and one that I certainly endorse-is to start paying
more attention to lower courts, and in particular to do so less on the grounds
of ideology than of competence. Unfortunately, it is not clear who besides the
legal academy will be willing to do so.
Another response is to recognize that the Courts of Appeals have managed
to achieve much more autonomy than the traditional model ofjudicial review
allows for because of the tremendous growth in federal caseloads. When the
Court of Appeals' output increases drastically while the Supreme Court's
ability to hear cases does not, the result is bound to be more freedom of action
for the lower courts. Judicial review, like any public good, tends to be
overused, and the consequences of that overuse are that it is not always
available when it is genuinely needed.
Most importantly, I think that Marbury has encouraged us to focus on the
Supreme Court in isolation, when perhaps we should be looking at the entire
judicial system as, well, a system21-and a system that is, itself, embedded in
an even more complex system that includes the legislative and executive

20. Id. at 1303, 1310 (footnote omitted).
21. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991)
(describing such an approach).
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branches, and even the polity at large. 2 Such narrow focus has its advantages,
of course. But perhaps it is time to take a broader view.

22. For a discussion of courts as complex systems embedded in a larger polity that is also
a complex system, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1635 (1995); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its PracticalMeaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1407 (1996).

